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MARK MAZOWER
THE REFUGEES, THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
AND THE COLLAPSE 
OF VENIZELIST HEGEMONY, 1929-1932
In the spring of 1932, John Drosopoulos warned that «Greece must orga­
nise herself as an up-to-date economic state, and tend to increase her produc­
tion by improving the imperfect means now in use in order that she may 
become as self-sufficient as possible...»1 His was by no means the first such 
warning. With memories of prewar emigration fresh in the mind, reinforced by 
new doubts about Greece’s «viability», commentators in the interwar period 
constantly stressed the need for domestic economic growth. Development 
economists would be inclined to pose the alternative paths to such growth in 
terms of a choice between import-substitution and exports; in practice, at least 
before 1932, Greek policy-makers saw these as complementary rather than 
alternatives. Another, more fundamental, strategic choice confronted them 
instead — that between rapid industrialisation or promoting growth through 
agriculture.
This was the choice which confronted modernising elites throughout Eu­
rope between the world wars. Ataturk in Turkey and Bcthlcn in Hungary 
concentrated their efforts on industrial growth, and used a heavy hand in the 
rural areas to force the farming population into acquiescence; Stalin’s policy 
was a more extreme version of the same strategy. In Rumania, Bratianu’s 
Liberals also sought to industrialise, but were handicapped by strong peasant 
opposition within a more democratic polity. Basically, it was difficult for 
democratic regimes to bear the social costs of rapid industrialisation. For a 
largely agrarian society, modernisation and capital accumulation within a de­
mocratic framework implied giving priority to agriculture over industry. This 
route may have involved a slower rate of growth than one which squeezed the
1. National Bank of Greece, Report for the Year 1931 of the Governor of the National Bank 
of Greece, Athens 1932, p. 44.
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rural sector dry, but it opened up new political possibilities. In Greece, to put it 
simply, the land reform, together with foreign loans, purchased peasant back­
ing for Venizelist rule, pushing industrialisation into second place.
In terms of the impact upon economic growth, the arrival of the refugees in 
Greece offered both burdens and opportunities. The burdens were immediately 
obvious: the heavy financial costs of both short-term and long-term resettle­
ment; the fears of «over-crowding» in an era plagued by demographic night­
mares; the real social tensions between the newcomers and established Greek 
society. However, there were also benefits: quite apart from their entrepreneu­
rial skills and initiative, the refugees also helped to «hellenise» the ethnic kalei­
doscope of northern Greece, and held out the promise of an expanded domes­
tic market and a cheap industrial workforce.
The immediate Venizelist response to the refugee influx in the early 1920s 
was to press ahead with the land reform. The Greek state shifted the costs of 
expropriation into the former owners of the land, freeing large areas which 
were eventually handed over to the Refugee Settlement Commission. Underly­
ing the agrarian bias of Venizelist policy was a fundamental political calcula­
tion. The Great War, Venizelos warned, had radicalised the masses and created 
the danger «of seeing the peasants, workers of the fields, and the industrial 
workers in the towns united in overturning the lawful state (to κράτος τον 
νόμου)} To forestall the threat of such a fatal coalition — intensified by the 
refugee influx — land reform was elevated into a central feature of the Venize­
list project. Conservative apprehensions were thinly disguised behind the 
paeans to official policy. «If the patriotism of the ruling classes and the good 
sense of the refugees», declared the RSC in its final report, «continue to hold in 
check those doctrines which claim that the happiness and the progress of a 
nation can only be acquired by submitting to the rule of a group of fanatics, 
enemies of all enlightenment, persecutors of all liberties and all initiative; and 
if, in several dozen years... a strong race of peasants, born out of the mixing of 
all the elements of hellenism, secures... the prosperity of Greece, that result will 
have been due to the impulse originally given by the RSC».2 3
That the RSC, and the Greek State, were prompted by such fears should 
not blind us to their very real achievements. It is surely not necessary to 
describe here the RSC’s enormous impact upon Greek agriculture. By 1929 
over half a million refugees had been settled, mostly in the north. The RSC 
organised a cadastral survey, built houses, provided livestock, farming tools 
and technical advice. «What a miracle!» enthused Jacques Ancel in his classic 
study of the transformation of Macedonia.4
2. S. Stefanou (ed.), Tà κείμενα του ’Ελευθερίου Βενιζέλου, vol. 3, Athens 1983, ρ. 82.
3. Bank of Athens, Bulletin, 100 (Dec. 1930), p. 1868.
4. Cited in Dimitris Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact upon 
Greece, The Hague 1962.
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Such a verdict ignores the very real problems that accompanied the RSC’s 
work — problems to which we shall return. But the important point is that no 
one could even have thought of passing a similar judgment upon the State’s 
treatment of the urban refugees. Their continued neglect highlighted the stark 
strategic political choice which the State had made in favour of the countryside 
— what Venizelos himself termed «a paternal solicitude in favour of agricul­
ture». The half a million or so refugees who settled in the cities lived in appal­
ling squalor: two-thirds of the families visited by RSC staff were housed in 
temporary dwellings; over one-third were in «mere hovels which should be 
demolished at the earliest opportunity».5 Greece’s prewar urban housing crisis 
was intensified as the cities now coped with a massive increase in the pool of 
labour. Meanwhile, real wages fell through the 1920’s, contributing to rapid 
industrialisation.
Venizelos himself, one of the few prominent politicians to show any enthu­
siasm for industrialisation at all, saw it as a way of absorbing the urban 
refugees into economic life. For that very reason, however, he was opposed to 
measures which raised the cost of labour and discouraged industrial invest­
ment. To a visiting delegate from the International Labour Office, Venizelos 
confirmed that «the urgent necessity of securing work for the great mass of 
refugees, the small proportion among them of male workers, and finally the 
necessity of dedicating all the available resources to the most urgent task of 
resettlement, have not permitted the implementation of measures which would 
be useful but might prevent the creation of new industries... and halt the 
development of others».6
Rather than creating a politically unreliable proletariat, subservient to size­
able industries, the State and the RSC preferred to encourage the urban refu­
gees to form small businesses of their own. The «petty-bourgeois classes» were 
regarded as «valuable for social equilibrium». The National Bank prided itself 
in 1925 that its lending policies had «led tens of thousands of petty bourgeois 
refugees into production and regular life, creating from this passive element 
autonomous tiny economic units, rather than falling inevitably and fatefully 
victims of diverse subversive propaganda whose end result would be grievous
5. Messager d’Athènes, 28 July 1928; H. Morgenthau, I was Sent to Athens, New York 1929, 
p. 243; Lila Leontidou, Πόλεις τής Σιωπής: ’Εργατικός έποικισμός τής Αθήνας καί του Πειραι­
ά, 1909-1940, Athens 1989, chs. 4-5.
6. FO 371/15960 C2886/324, Velizelos-Simon, 3 April 1932, enclosing the ILO report «Les 
conditions du travail des salaires, de l’industrie et de commerce»; A. Liakos, «'Ο ’Ελευθέριος 
Βενιζέλος καί το Διεθνές Γραφείο ’Εργασίας», Σύγχρονα Θέματα, 31 (Oct. 1987) ρ. 42; Α. 
Papathanasiou, «La politique sociale de la Grèce», Les Balkans, 17-18 (Feb.-March 1932), p. 
258-281.
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constitutional and social disturbances, if not uprisings».7 Such self-congratula­
tion was, however, premature, for as numerous commentators pointed out, by 
leaving the organisation of industrial credit to the private sector rather than 
creating an equivalent to the Agricultural Bank, the State had allowed the 
fortunes of urban business to rise and fall with the market. After 1929, the 
supply of credit dried up, and many businesses ran into trouble. The collapse 
of the refugee-dominated carpet industry was to highlight the failure of official 
policy.
However, the political implications of this economic strategy for Venize- 
lism took some time to emerge. Until the end of the 1920s, Venizelos’s hold 
over refugee loyalties was secure. The appeal of the KKE was restricted by its 
sectarian infighting, its anti-agrarian line and its unpopular policy towards 
Macedonia. No other socialist party managed to bid successfully for the labour 
vote. The Socialist Workers Union, formed by prominent reformists, was 
quickly absorbed by Kafandaris’s Venizelist faction. The truth was that Ve­
nizelos’s enormous popularity left no room for a moderate socialist alternative. 
«So long as we live in a bourgeois state, let us live in it without being a 
revolutionary element opposed to the bourgeois economic policy of the state», 
wrote the editor of Kampana, a Mytilene newspaper which reflected the think­
ing of left-wing Venizelism.8 The 1928 election triumph was perhaps the high- 
point of Venizelo’s prestige in the inter-war period. But for some time after­
wards, even prominent anti-Venizelists seemed content to see their arch-rival at 
the helm. «Every Greek in his right mind», remarked George Streit in early 
1930, «must hope that [Venizelos] would be able to carry through his plan of 
building up the country economically».9 The most serious challenge to Venize­
list hegemony would come not from anti-Venizelism, but from the gradual 
fragmentation of the Venizelist bloc, including key fractions of the refugee 
vote; the catalyst for this was the world economic crisis.
Refugee votes had, after all, won Venizelos the 1928 election and would be 
crucial in its sequel, due in 1932 at the latest. When the new-comers had first 
arrived in Greece, their intense loyalty to Venizelos had led them to turn a deaf 
ear to communism and other radical political options. Seven years later in 
Mytilene, a town where half the inhabitants were refugees, the sharp increase in 
support for the communists in the 1931 by-election-up from 7% to 21% since 
1928 — was a worrying portent.
7. Cited in Margarita Dritsa, Βιομηχανία καί τράπεζες στήν 'Ελλάδα τοΰ μεσοπολέμου, 
Athens 1990, ρ. 336.
8. Sofia Mathaiou, «Ή έφημερίδα “Καμπάνα”», Μνημών, vol. 10 (1985), ρρ.212-235.
9. US National Archives, 868.00/626, Skinner (Athens) - State, 15 Jan. 1930.
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It is a measure of Venizelos’ stature as a statesman that he had not allowed 
the threat of the refugee reaction to deter him from pursuing a rapprochement 
with the Turkish Government when he returned to power in 1928. This last act 
of inspired diplomacy culminated in several bilateral agreements signed in 
Ankara in October 1930. An essential preliminary, however, was the Conven­
tion signed that June which provided a definitive solution to the problem of 
liquidating the properties abandoned since 1922 by the Moslem and Greek 
Orthodox refugees. Since the Lausanne Convention the two governments had 
been unsuccessfully negotiating over this issue. Now they agreed to let each 
government enter into possession of the properties vacated by refugees from its 
teritory: the Greek Government took over formerly Moslem properties, and 
issued bonds to the refugees which provided for their partial indemnification 
by the state. The refugees greeted these arrangements with indignation and 
disappointment. They resented Venizelos’ apparent acceptance of the Turkish 
argument that Greek properties in Asia Minor had amounted to less than those 
vacated by the Moslems in Greece. They bitterly attacked the Liberal Govern­
ment for refusing to provide them with full compensation; and perhaps at a 
deeper level, they also reacted strongly to the idea that all their hopes of an 
eventual return to their former homes must now be given up.10
Venizelos believed that it was better for the refugees to adapt themselves as 
quickly as possible to their new life in Greece. The pro-government Ergasia 
admonished them in the spring of 1930, insisting that they «put an end to their 
demands and devote all their energy in this new economic environment to the 
development that would be decisive for their future».11 Venizelos could, after 
all, make the case that so far as the refugees were concerned, the counterpart to 
his emollient overtures to Ankara was the land reform and re-settlement pro­
gramme at home. It was not by chance that the year of the Ankara Conention 
also saw the Greek Ministry of Agriculture and the new Agricultural Bank take 
over the functions of the Refugee Settlement Commission, which was now 
wound up: the tast of assisting the refugees was henceforth to fall to the Greek 
Government alone.
But Venizelos’s diplomacy with Turkey was not the only cause of growing 
refugee dissatisfaction with the Liberal leader. By 1930, a number of underly­
ing problems associated with the land reform had emerged. From the outset, 
legal uncertainties had bedevilled the question of property rights, and the
10.1. Anastasiadou, «Ό Βενιζέλος καί tò έλληνοτουρκικό σύμφωνο φιλίας του 1930» in Th. 
Veremis and O. Dimitrakopoulos (eds.), Μελετήματα γύρω άπό τον Βενιζέλο καί τήνέποχή του, 
Athens 1980, ρρ. 309-426.
11. Cited by Μ. Dritsa «Πρόσφυγες καί εκβιομηχάνιση» in Th. Veremis and G. Goulimi 
(eds.), ’Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος: Κοινωνία, οικονομία, πολιτική στήν έποχή του, Athens 1989, ρ. 
61.
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temporary allocation of land had discouraged farmers from making improve­
ments. Told that their title to the land would only be granted once they had 
repaid their debt to the state in full, many beneficiaries of the land reform 
looked forward, if not to returning to Turkey, then to moving to the city, 
seeking work as wage-earners and shopkeepers.
Perhaps hardest hit among the resettled refugees were the tobacco growers. 
At the time that the RSC was distributing land, there was a boom in the 
tobacco market: prices were high, and land in tobacco-growing areas was 
distributed in plots so small that only intensive cash-crop cultivation was 
economic. At first the Government had been concerned that the departure of 
Muslim farmers would imperil the cultivation of the crop. Such fears proved 
unfounded. As tobacco exports soared, growing the crop was soon regarded as 
a way «not only to sustain the households of the producers of the region, but to 
bring those economically and psychologically shipwrecked human beings, re­
fugees and native-born, to an island of paradise till then unknown, where 
wealth was as abundant as in a dream». By 1929 certain areas of eastern 
Macedonia and Thrace had become entirely dependent on tobacco, which had 
turned into the key commodity in the Greek economy.12
Money poured into the tobacco economy in the 1920s and by 1927 the 
National Bank was making more loans against tobacco than against any other 
crop. Producers set up «cooperatives» to take advantage of easily-available 
credit. «Ask producers who are not members if they have enrolled in coopera­
tives», wrote an observer, «I didn’t need a loan up till now» they will tell you. 
According to some refugee smallholders: «Cooperative is a piece of paper 
which up to seven paidia sign and take to the bank to get money».13 By 1930 
local bank managers were extremely worried at prevailing levels of indebted­
ness: credit was being spent on consumer goods, or wage labour, at levels 
which could only be sustained so long as the boom kept prices high.
As producer prices began to fall, two things happened: in the first place, 
growers were unable to pay their debts, putting the entire fragile credit struc­
ture of rural Greece — with its complex links between growers, merchants, 
money-lenders and banks — under increasing strain; second, growers began to 
face starvation, since for many of them, the plots they farmed were too small to 
allow them to retreat into self-sufficiency.
Faced with a threat to the banking system, the authorities felt impelled to 
act. But how, and for whose benefit? On the one hand, it seemed ludicrous to 
jeopardise the land reform by allowing the new smallholders to be bankrupted; 
yet debt relief was a potentially enormous expense for a government in no 
position to take on new commitments.
12. F. Altsitzoglu, Oi γιακάδες καί ό κάμπος τής Ξάνθης, Athens 1941, ρ. 545.
13. N. I. Anagnostopoulos, Ό κάμπος των Σερρών, Athens 1937, ρρ. 72-73.
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Refugee farmers were particularly vociferous in calling for government 
action to scale down the debts they had incurred during the re-settlement. 
Many prosfygopateres (refugee «fathers») had attacked the RSC for supposed­
ly exploiting the settlers financially in the interests of foreign bondholders. 
Once the RSC had been dissolved, the refugees directed their claims against the 
Greek state. Negotiations in the spring of 1930 between the RSC and the 
government did result in a number of decisions favourable to the refugees; the 
rate of interest on their debts was scaled down, whilst it was agreed they would 
not be charged various expenses incurred by the RSC. In effect, the Greek 
Government agreed to shoulder a large part of the settlement expenditure 
itself.14 But these concessions did not satisfy refugee leaders who continued to 
insist that the Greek state should have met all the costs of re-settling the 
newcomers.
Venizelos was not sympathetic to their demands. Touring northern Greece 
in May 1930, to explain his new Turkish policy, he made it clear that his 
Government would insist on the agricultural refugees repaying their debts to 
the state: it was not merely their moral duty, but also necessary if the remaining 
homeless refugee families were to be provided for. But this proved to be an 
extremely unpopular stance in the face of what one anti-Venizelist journalist 
called the «great crisis of rural Greece». Already at the 5th Tobacco Growers 
Congress, held in Salonika in January 1930, it was obvious that the Liberals 
had lost a lot of ground among the delegates to other parties, particularly the 
Agrarians. Despite a lengthy address by Gonatas, Governor-General of Mace­
donia, defending the Liberal Government’s record, the Congress as a whole 
had a marked anti-Government, indeed anti-capitalistic tone. As support for 
the Agrarian Party grew in northern and central Greece over the coming 
months, Venizelos denounced what he described as «class parties». But Pei- 
tharchia, a Venizelist weekly critical of the Liberal leader’s rhetorical excesses, 
pointed out that the problem did not lie in the revolutionary aspirations of the 
Agrarians: «the farmer of northern Greece is coming to believe that the cause 
of his misfortune is the insatiable capitalism which all bourgeois government 
serve, the present one especially. It is reality as well as the press which teaches 
him this. He learns that in the towns lives a mass of rich privileged people who 
enjoy cinemas, theaters, cars and a thousand other benefits while he works 
incessantly and goes hungry. Mr. Venizelos has promised him, or he thinks he 
has, wondrous good fortune. Instead of this, however, the support of the RSC 
has ended, likewise the loans... and in their place come failed harvests, the
14. S.P. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, New York 1932, pp. 
692-696.
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worldwide economic crisis and sheer poverty. What is he supposed to do?»15
Not surprisingly, a new disillusionment with Venizelos, and a shift to more 
radical critiques of the capitalist path to development, spread through north­
ern Greece. Reporting to Venizelos in March 1932, the nomarch of Cavalla 
warned that the Liberal Party had lost ground since 1928 in the countryside. 
His report vividly reveals the outlook and response of the local authorities: 
The Communist Party... has acquired new followers even in the country­
side, where three years ago one could say none existed. Of course I 
cannot say that those turning to communism are entirely conscious 
communists, but they are what one might call agrotokommounistai. 
That is, there are in the country areas men who are conscious commu­
nists and who through their constant teaching of the suffering farmers 
manage to indoctrinate villagers who, I repeat, do not really know about 
communism. Against these teachers of communism, who present them­
selves as agropateres, we are taking every preventive and repressive mea­
sure, thus enlightening the simple and ignorant folk.16
It is worth noting that in this report, the nomarch equated communism 
with membership of the Agrarian Party as well as with the KKE. What the 
authorities were reacting to, in other words, in the case of the agrarian crisis of 
the early 1930s was less the rise of the KKE than a more general radicalisation 
of that very part of the population, the rural smallholders, who had originally 
been seen as a bastion of the bourgeois order.
As they watched the «microbe of politics» spread through the countryside, 
it was obvious to the Liberals that they would have to do something more to 
retain the support of the smallholders they had helped bring into existence. 
Natural catastrophe pushed them into action: a series of harsh winters culmi­
nated in the storms and floods of 1930-31 which led starving peasants, chiefly 
shepherds and tobacco growers, to stream into the towns of northern Greece to 
receive the free maize distributed by the Agricultural Bank.17 As for the longer 
term measures which were clearly required, the first impulse of the Govern­
ment was to look abroad. In July 1931 the Cabinet decided to seek the support 
of the League of Nations in raising money for a loan to consolidate the agricul­
tural debt. But they could not have chosen a worse time in view of the chaos in 
international money markets. As a result they realised that the burden of 
relieving rural indebtedness would have to be borne by domestic rather than 
foreign creditors.
15. M. Notaras, Ή άγροτική άποκατάστασις των προσφύγων, Athens 1934, ρρ. 172-189; 
Πρωία, 16 May 1930; AEV 173/127, Gonatas-Venizelos, 27/1/30; Πειθαρχία, 15/3/31.
16. AEV 173/111, 26 March 1932.
17. C. Evelpides, Ή έξέλιξις τής γεωργικής κρίσεως, Athens 1935, ρ. 101.
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In October, on the eve of another-bad winter, the Government suspended 
the direct land tax levied on most crops (though not on tobacco), declared a 
five-year moratorium on agricultural debts owed to private individuals and 
also suspended the seizure of farmers’ properties against such debts. Provincial 
merchants, bank managers and local money-lenders all protested in vain: the 
Government had resolved to sacrifice their sympathies in order to win back the 
discontented beneficiaries of the land reform.18 The architect of these measures 
was Ioannis Karamanos, an Italian-trained agricultural expert and formerly a 
senior official in the RSC who had moved to become the director-general at the 
re-organised Ministry of Agriculture. Justifying the debt moratorium, Kara­
manos argued that «the Government has created a large class whose existence 
helps to maintain the social equilibrium of the country. In these circumstances, 
it must necessarily see with anxiety the forced sale of many small agricultural 
properties at low prices, to meet obligations assumed at a time when agricultu­
ral prices fetched high prices. The situation thus created may undo all the good 
done by the Government at such heavy cost».19
In particular these policies were felt to be necessary to stem the migration 
from the countryside into the towns. This exodus from the rural areas had 
alarmed commentators in Athens for several years. In December 1929, the 
cartoonist Demetriades published sketch entitled «The Last Farmer», showing 
a villager leading his donkey, wife and child off to Athens «to cultivate letters.» 
According to Karavidas, an employee of the Agriculturak Bank, the problem 
lay in the basic fact that «the traditional aspirations of our rural population do 
not lie in farming... When the harvest is a success, the surplus is used to open a 
shop or to send the son to Athens to study law»20. For many refugees there 
were pragmatic reasons for such attitudes: they had no permanent title to their 
land, and often did not come from farming backgrounds. Many left for the 
towns to work as labourers or, if they were lucky, to set up a shop with the 
money they had gained from selling off land and farming equipment21. As farm 
prices fell, the drift from the land continued, alarming many observers who 
doubted the capacity of the towns to support them. «The agricultural workers 
who go to the towns and cannot find employment in industry», wrote Karama­
nos, «would inevitably go to swell the ranks of those who depend for their
18. USNA 868.00/673, Morris Athens - State, 5 April 1932; FO 371/18403 R2908/2908, 
Waterlow Athens - FO, 2 May 1934.
19. League of Nations, The Agricultural Crisis, vol. 1 - Geneva 1931, p. 188; a laudatory 
portrait of Karamanos is in H. Morgenthau, I Was Sent to Athens, 270-272.
20. K. Karavidas, Αγροτικά, Athens 1930, p. 496; this problem had been in the public eye at 
least as early as 1926, cf. Banque d'Athènes, Bulletin, no. 54 (February 1927).
21. Theodorou, «Γεωργοοικονομικη μελετη επι τεσσάρων άντιπροσωπευτικών χωρίων τοΓ 
λοφώδους τμήματος τής περιφερείας Κατερίνης», Γεωργικόν Δελτίον, vol. 5 (1939), 62-63.
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livelihood on parasitic trades or casual labour. This class is already numerous 
and its existence precarious, and there is a risk that its members may one day 
join the extremist elements»22.
Conditions in the towns certainly bad enough to arouse anxiety. The urban 
refugees had even more cause to be restive than their rural counterparts since 
the assistance they had received from the RSC still left many families living in 
wretched conditions. According to Morgenthau, the task of housing them 
remained had been only partly completed by 1929. In Salonika he found 
settlements where malaria and tuberculosis were rife, sanitation and heating 
arrangements primitive and privacy impossible to obtain: «Cooking is done in 
little charcoal braziers improvised out of tin cans and bricks. The roofs of these 
buildings leak with every rain and the walls are full of gaping cracks that let in 
the cold damp winds of winter. In visiting this settlement, wherever one’s eye 
turns it is greeted by signs of human misery — death, disease, and bodily 
suffering and semi-starvation»23. Those who lived in these shanty-towns re­
ceived little support from the authorities. Property had been distributed among 
the refugees on the principle that those in the best position to pay for it would 
receive most. While this approach may have made sense in view of the extreme­
ly limited resources at the disposal of the Greek state, it contributed to the 
poorer refugees sense of alienation. «One would have expected», wrote Mikalis 
Notaras in his detailed study of the problem, «after the economic overturning 
of an enormous mass of people, of various social classes,... that the bourgeois 
conception of property would have yielded to a more up-to-date, developed 
and consistent concept of justice whose balancing influence would have blunt­
ed social conflicts and grounded the banner of the postwar state more firm­
ly»24. The slump hit these urban refugees hard, particularly those employed at 
pitiful wages in trade and industry.
The tobacco workers, with their large refugee core, led the way in Salonika 
and Cavalla. The 1928 election had seen Venizelos win back their sympathies 
from the KKE, a fact not unrelated tó the Liberal leader’s open support for 
striking tobacco workers in the month before the election. At a pre-election
22. League of Nations, The Agricultural Crisis, vol. 1, p. 189; L. Polychronis, Σκέψεις έπί τοΰ 
γεωργικού μας προβλήματος, Athens 1931; cf. the same phenomenon in Italy in A. Treves, Le 
Migrazioni Interne nell’ Italia Fascista, Turin 1976, chs. 7-8. The existence in Italy of a strong 
industrial lobby associated with the towns meant that the authorities stressed the danger to «public 
order» rather than falling back on blanket denunciations of urban «parasitism» as they did in 
Greece.
23. Henry Morgenthau, I Was Sent to Athens, New York 1929, pp. 246-247.
24. M. Notaras, Ή άγροτική άποκατάστασις των προσφύγων, Athens 1934, p. 124.
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rally in Salonika Venizelos had pledged to introduce a labour policy favoura­
ble to the worker. What they got instead, of course, was the Idionymon, which 
gave the police sweeping powers of repression. In 1930 after months of ha­
rassment, the Idionymon was used to dissolve the workers’ Tobacco Federa­
tion and its affiliates. Not surprisingly, the tobacco workers’ response was to 
turn away from Venizelism again. Despite, or perhaps because of the very 
extensive political repression, directed through local Public Security commit­
tees, the workforce became increasingly radical in its demands. When Venize­
los visited Cavalla on the eve of the 1932 election, he was greeted with such 
shouts of disapproval that he had to leave without speaking, an event which 
would have been unheard-of four years earlier. The culmination of refugee 
alienation would come in February 1934 with the election of Communist 
mayors in Cavalla and Serres25.
Many other refugees had started out in business during the 1920s as self- 
employed traders, pedlars and shop-keepers. As we have seen, the RSC and the 
State had actually promoted the formation of small family firms. The Greek 
legal system encouraged a tendency to retail-trade fragmentation which the 
boom atmosphere of mid-decade also fostered. In Jannina —- a town of around 
20.000 inhabitants — there were 246 grocers, 137 cafes and 42 hairdressers. 
Local observers attributed the «excessive» number of shopkeepers in the Salo­
nika area to the activity of the refugees who sought to take advantage of the 
inflation and easy credit to establish themselves as intermediaries, investing 
particularly heavily in import goods. Within a few years refugee traders were 
supposed to have ousted the Jews as the dominant element in commerce in 
Salonika.26
At the end of the 1920s, several forces combined to jeopardise the position 
of these small businesses. In the first place, the stabilization of the drachma 
ended the mild inflation of the mid-1920s; almost immediately after, deflation 
set in. As early as March 1929 the Ionian Bank’s manager in Salonika was 
reporting that «the precarious state of commerce in our market becomes ap­
parent from the frequent failures of big merchants and the frequent, almost 
daily fires in shops, several of which proved to be not casual». Wholesale prices 
peaked in the first quarter of 1929, and by early 1930 had fallen almost ten per 
cent, dropping a further ten per cent over the rest of the year. In addition, poor
25. Άρχεΐον Έλ. Βενιζέλου (Μπενάκη), 173/111, Nomarch of Kavalla - Prime Minister’s 
Political Office, 26 March 1932 gives a graphic illustration of the official mentality and the scale of 
repression; G. Pegios, ’Από την ιστορία του συνδικαλιστικού κινήματος τής Καβάλας 1922- 
1953, Athens 1984, ρ. 49 gives the view from the other side.
26. A. Pepelasis, «The legal system and economic development of Greece», Journal of Econo­
mic History, voi. 19,2 (June 1959), 195; USNA, 868.00B/39, «Political and economic effects of the 
refugees in Greek Macedonia», 23/12/29.
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cereal harvests sharply curtailed peasant consumption. Traders who had tied 
up funds in stocks of imported goods (or for that matter tobacco) faced imme­
diate losses. The banks, which in towns like Cavalla had been lavish in granting 
credits to refugee merchants, suddenly took fright after 1929. «The merchants 
in your market», a bank manager in Cavalla was informed by London head 
office, «have abused through over-trading to an unbelievable extent the facili­
ties foolishly granted to them by Banks in their insane and inexperienced 
competition with each other and have to pay the price».27 The farmers’ debt 
moratorium tied up the fund of urban banks and investors and reduced aggre­
gate demand in the towns. Some commentators also argued that cut-throat 
competition among new firms had led to a fall in profit rates which together 
with the eradication of speculative opportunities on the exchanges increased 
bankruptcies. Stephen Ladas noted in 1932 that while the poorest refugees had 
benefitted from the Liberal Government’s large public works outlays, it was 
«the class of middlemen and of small traders that seems to be most severely 
suffering in the large cities».28
The longer-term political implications for Venizelism were critical. Along­
side the refugees’ shift to the Left which we referred to earlier occurred other 
realignments. In Salonika, commercial rivalry between Greek merchants and 
the large Jewish community fuelled growing anti-semitism. The first prominent 
sign of this was the appearance of a National Macedonian Organisation in 
1926 which called for a commercial boycott against the Jews. The following 
year the National Union of Greece (EEE) was founded, with a mostly refugee 
membership; this organisation was responsible for the worst anti-semitic out­
rage of the inter-war period, the Campbell riots in Salonika in June 1931, when 
a Jewish neighbourhood was set on fire. Venizelos’ condemnation of these 
events was lukewarm: he criticised the recourse to violence but expressed his 
sympathy with what he regarded as primarily an anti-communist nationalist 
organisation.29
Venizelos’ previously secure grip on refugee loyalties was now slipping and 
other political leaders made bids for their support. During the parliamentary 
debate on the Ankara Convention in June 1930 Kafandaris, Kondylis and the 
Agrarians proclaimed their rejection of its terms. Most striking of all was the 
new attitude of the Populists. Tsaldaris, for the first time, added his voice to 
those who called for greater compensation for the refugees. As the crisis wor­
sened, Populist overtures to the refugees met with some success. By the spring
27. IBA, Kavalla, General Manager (London) - Ziffo (Kavalla), 24 March 1930.
28. IBA, Salonika, HYR 1928/29, pi; Salonika, HYR 1929/30, pp. 1-4; Stephen P. Ladas, The 
Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, New York 1932, p. 678.
29. G. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, Berkeley 1983, p. 255; USNA 868.00/660, Skinner 
(Athens) - State, 12/12/31.
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of 1932 Tsaldaris was able to deliver a speech at one of the main refugee 
quarters of Salonika — something which according to the American consul 
there «could not have happened a few years ago»30.
What, though, needs emphasizing at this point is the sanguine way in which 
many commentators and public figures interpreted the difficulties facing the 
urban refugees, and in particular, those in business. «Is there an economic 
crisis in Greece?» asked the Bulletin of the Bank of Athens in September 1929. 
Dimitris Sfikas gave a crisp answer: there was no crisis of any sort. The 
stabilisation of the drachma had, it was true, led to a new «spirit of economy» 
which restricted consumption and increased bankruptcies among the small 
firms which had sprung up over the last few years. But this was, according to 
him, a welcome development, a symptom of the long-desired «re-establish- 
ment» of the economy. In the 1920s there had been «a truly stupefying growth» 
of traders, especially after the arrival of the refugees in the towns virtually all of 
whom, he added with some exaggeration, had gone into commerce. The cur­
rent wave of bankruptcies was nothing more than a return to «the normal 
order of things ».31 Another journalist drew the same conclusion, observing 
that two-thirds of the bankruptcies in the Athens-Piraeus area in 1928 had 
liabilities of less than 100.000 drachmas, and chiefly involved small mer­
chants32. According to the British vice-consul there, there was «properly speak­
ing, no economic crisis, only a surplus of entrepreneurs.» Early in 1930 the 
British commercial attache reported that «there is no doubt that the market 
will adjust itself at no distant date, and if the recent difficulties have had the 
result of eliminating a large number of unimportant commercial and industrial 
concerns, they will have served a good purpose33. In similar vein, Liberal 
Finance Minister George Maris insisted that «we shouldn’t exaggerate our 
difficulties» — Greece was merely in a period of transition from inflation to 
stabilisation. And the Populists agreed: one senior figure, George Streit, said 
that the country was passing temporarily through a «businessman’s crisis, due 
to over-speculation»34.
There were several reasons why the slump was viewed with so little alarm. 
Proponents of business rationalisation — and there were many in Greece — 
saw the crisis as the way in which market force's themselves would «prune» or 
«cleanse» the domestic economy of the inefficient firms founded in the «period
30. USNA 868.00/673, Morris (Athens) - State, 5 April 1932.
31. Banque d’Athènes, Bulletin, no. 85 (September 1929), p. 1539-1541.
32. ibid., no. 87 (November, 1929), 1591.
33. FO 371/13658 C8833/1124, Harvey - FO, 20 Nov. 1929; FO 371/14386 C1035/468, Ram­
say — FO, 6 Feb. 1930; Chadziiosif, «Βενιζελογενής άντιπολίτευση», pp. 448-449.
34. Banque d’Athènes, Bulletin, no. 89 (January 1930), pp. 1641-1642; USNA 868.00/626, 
Skinner (Athens) - State, 15 Jan. 1930.
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of gaspillage» in the 1920s. In an article entitled «The crisis and parasitism» a 
writer for Peitharchia described the need for a «new equilibrium» in which 
those businessman with adequate resources would survive and begin to operate 
«with thrift and good housekeeping (noikokyrosyni)». The Government was 
keen to downplay the impact of the slump in Greece for fear of weakening the 
country’s credit standing abroad. But there was also the fact that before the 
autumn of 1931 it was quite plausible to argue — as did the pro-Liberal Ethnos 
— that in Greece one saw none of those «mournful indices which characterise 
the crisis in other countries»35.
There was no downturn in domestic manufacturing until 1932 — after the 
«battle for the drachma» had been fought and lost. True, ill-advised bank 
lending to industry had begun to cause liquidity problems for several commer­
cial banks by 1930. But overall lending levels remained surprisingly high. One 
of the country’s most brilliant economists argued convincingly at the time that 
far from cutting credit, the Bank of Greece had pursued a deliberately expan­
sionary policy after 192836.
Although the impact of the slowdown in world trade hit export sectors 
hard, its effect on Greece’s overall external account was cushioned for a time 
by several factors. Invisible earnings held up well; more importantly, import 
prices collapsed even faster than exports, yielding terms of trade gains to the 
national economy of around 30% between 1928 and 1932. This was chiefly 
because Greece, unlike the Danubian states, was a wheat importer on a mas­
sive scale and thus benefitted from lower world wheat prices. As import vo­
lumes did not begin to fall heavily until 1931, the reduction in the trade deficit 
was very largely due to the rapid fall in import prices.
In turn, however, this suggested that the Liberal Government, which pu­
blicised the country’s terms of trade gains, was little justified in claiming the 
credit for the smaller deficit. Import consumption was being maintained at 
surprisingly high levels. Yet Venizelos insisted that there was no cause for 
alarm. He was optimistic by nature, as he readily confessed, but he also be­
lieved that his ability to convey that optimism to his countrymen accounted for 
much of his past success. When attacked in March 1930 over the budgetary 
position by his former Interior Minister, Zavitsianos, Venizelos responded: «I 
am sure that the Greek people will continue to follow those men who have 
resolute faith in the future, not those who see everything black and grim.» A 
few months later, speaking in the Macedonian town of Drama, he reiterated:
35. Banque d’Athènes, Bulletin, no. 85 (Sept. 1929), p. 1539; ibid., no. 101 (Jan. 1931), p. 1893.
36. P. Christodoulopoulos, Πιστωτική πολιτική καί περιοδικές κρίσεις, Athens 1930, passim; 
for further contemporary evidence, cf. IBA, Patras, YR 1930/31, 11; IBA. Salonika, YR 1930/31, 
1-2; K. Kostis, Τράπεζες καί κρίση, p. 87; AEV 343, Koryzis-Venizelos, 12 June 1931.
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«My optimism consists in believing that everything will turn out for the best 
provided we work — as we are working — systematically»37.
But Venizelos’s optimism, which had been triumphantly justified in the 
heady days of the Balkan Wars, rang hollow amid the unmistakable signs of 
economic depression. Educated circles formerly supportive of the Lioberal 
leader began to distance themselves from his sanguine approach. In October 
1929 Venizelist dissidents founded a new weekly, Peitharchia (Discipline), de­
voted to promoting «democracy with disciplined ideals» and outspokenly criti­
cal of what they regarded as Venizelos’s excessive self-confidence. From its 
pages came a wide variety of criticisms of the Government, ranging from those 
who attacked the Liberal premier for his over-bearing role in his party, and his 
failure to organise it on less autocratic lines, to others, like the pro-Fascist 
Antonios Bernaris, who saw the only solution for a «disorganised» Greece in «a 
system of concentration, tough discipline, a dictator to direct production... an 
economist with the iron will of a Bismarck»38.
If the Venizelist coalition had begun to come apart at the seams before the 
financial crisis, the failure to win the «battle for the drachma» was the last 
straw. The stringently deflationary policy pursued up to April 1932 led to 
increasing criticism of the Government, as well as riots and demonstrations 
which had to be broken up by force. The drachma’s eventual departure from 
gold destroyed Venizelos’s claims to economic competence even among his 
most committed supporters. The US consul in Salonika reported on 6 April, 
that «considerable discontent with the present government prevails, not only 
among those who are opposed to Venizelos in principle, but amongst the 
Liberals who supported him in 1928... Even the refugees, who have always 
supported Mr. Venizelos to the full have begun to show dissatisfaction with his 
present policies»39. The KKE argued that the labouring classes had borne the 
brunt of defending gold. For the Agrarians, Pournaras argued that «the eco­
nomic policy of the bourgeois state ceased long ago to have even superficially a 
popular basis40.
In this context, Venizelos’ deliberate resuscitation of the issue of the di- 
chasmos in the summer of 1932 had a quite precise electoral purpose. Its target 
was not the anti-Venizelist camp but the old elements of the 1928 Venizelist 
coalition which, he hoped, could be dragooned into accepting his leadership 
one more time. This strategy almost succeeded, but it revealed the extent to 
which the Liberal archigos felt challenged. Over time, the sense of threat grew:
37. S. Stefanou (ed.), Πολιτικοί ύποθήκαι, vol. 1, pp. 18-19.
38. Πειθαρχία, 7 Dec. 1930.
39. US National Archives, 868.00/673, Morris-State, 26 April 1932.
40. D. Pournaras, Ή οικονομική θέσις των άγροτών, Athens 1932, ρ. 95.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 00:51:43 |
134 MARK MAZOWER
technocrats like Bernaris, admirers of Fascist Italy, criticised Venizelos for 
having offered Greece, not sound management but simply, an exaggerated 
picture of «a country of miracles». Venizelos’s famous optimism was being 
thrown back in his face. Young economists, planners and social reformers 
looked on distastefully at the resurgence of «dichasmos» passions, and 
dreamed of an apolitical state run by «experts.» Meanwhile, the KKE’s adop­
tion of the Popular Front strategy allowed it to tap the disaffection of rural 
Greece more effectively. The strike wave which hit northern Greece in the 
spring of 1936 suggested that the main issue in Greek politics was no longer 
Venizelism versus anti-Venizelism: to some extent it was Athens versus the 
provinces; it was also «the bourgeois political world» against all signs of politi­
cal or economic dissent. Whatever our judgement about the success or other­
wise of the refugee resettlement in the long run, in the short-run it had clearly 
failed to secure the triumph of Venizelism: key sectors of the refugee popula­
tion, such as the tobacco growers, tobacco workers and many urban traders, 
were forced into destitution by the economic crisis. From their viewpoint, the 
response of the Venizelist state was to meet their protests with increasingly 
vigorous police repression. The entire conflict was couched rather misleadingly 
in terms of communism versus the bourgeois order, and this sort of language 
showed how far inter-war Venizelism had abandoned its radical roots and 
travelled down the path to the Cold War.
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